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emergency preparedness handling of these accidents and incidents. It further discusses the 
emergency preparedness challenges for petroleum exploration and production in arctic and sub-
arctic areas. 
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Summary  
 
Today rise in oil and gas demand, energy crisis, issues concerning energy security and increase 
in oil prices in the world provoke further exploration and production of oil and gas. The Arctic 
Sea is the last frontier of abundant hydrocarbon reserves. Having effective regulations, 
innovative technologies and adequate safety norms, the world has still seen some major accidents 
such as Gulf of Mexico accident. Knowing that offshore petroleum industry is moving further 
north in Arctic poses additional challenges due to harsh climatic conditions and remoteness from 
existing oil and gas infrastructure.  
 
The objective of this thesis is to provide an overview of offshore petroleum activity in arctic and 
sub-arctic areas as well as the accidents which took place in these areas. Furthermore, the 
accidents are analyzed with respect to the emergency preparedness handling of accidents using 
the NORSOK Z-013 standard as one basis. The thesis also discusses the anticipated emergency 
preparedness challenges for arctic and sub-arctic areas.  
 
The Arctic Sea is the final destination in the north having enormous amount of hydrocarbons. 
The harsh weather conditions of the Arctic Sea characterized by polar lows, long nights, extreme 
fog and sub-zero temperatures have not prevented the countries bordering the Arctic Sea in 
exploiting the oil and gas resources. Russia, having extended pipeline infrastructure, has the most 
active part in the Arctic region followed by the US and Norway. The offshore exploration and 
production activities in the Canadian and Greenland Arctic Sea are gradually progressing.  
 
Up to date, there have been very few accidents in the Arctic Sea thereby providing a limited 
knowledge base for emergency response in the Arctic Sea. The accidents which we have been 
able to account for are mainly related to blowout, pipeline leak, ship collision and capsize 
accidents. The accidents have occurred in the Russian Arctic Sea and the Alaskan Arctic Sea. 
 
 
The NORSOK Z-013 standard refers to alert, danger limitation, rescue, evacuation, and 
normalization as the five emergency preparedness phases and their detailed description is 
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available in the Activities Regulation by the Petroleum Safety Authority in Norway (PSAN). It is 
stated in the NORSOK Z-013 standard that a set of Defined Situation of Hazard and Accident 
(DSHA) needs to be defined as part of the risk and emergency preparedness analysis. The set of 
DSHAs provided in the “Trends in risk level” project is used in this thesis for the classification 
and analysis of the accidents in the Arctic Sea. 
 
The analysis of the accidents in the Arctic Sea shows that all the emergency operations went 
through the phases of alert and normalization while the oil spill related accidents did not pass 
through escape and evacuate operations as there were no personnel involved in these accidents. 
All the emergency operations were affected by bad and tough weather conditions. Advanced 
emergency preparedness tools, equipment and technology are needed for effective emergency 
operations under such conditions. Due to scarcity of accidents in the Arctic Sea, only four 
DSHAs (out of 12) have been experienced, or at least reported. It may be that some of the 
remaining DSHAs are not reported due to minor consequences.  
  
In addition to the lessons learned from the emergency response operations for the accidents 
experienced in the Arctic Sea, there are also some emergency preparedness challenges which can 
be anticipated.  The challenging weather conditions due to sudden polar lows, strong winds, 
spray icing, snowstorms and severe fog can hamper the emergency operations. Furthermore, long 
distances and lack of infrastructure can create communication and logistic problems and can 
result in delay of rescue and evacuation operations. Robust and reliable ice and weather data is a 
challenge due to global warming and may become a limiting factor for the adequate design of 
offshore equipment. The use and maintenance of emergency response equipment is also a 
challenge in sometimes dark, snowy and foggy areas of the Arctic Sea and the Barents Sea. 
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1. Introduction 
This chapter gives a background description about the need for dimensioning of emergency 
preparedness in the Arctic Sea. It also describes the objectives, scope and limitations, approach, 
and structure of the report.  
1.1 Background 
In the middle of the 21st century, the world will face doubling of energy use (Shell, 2011a). The 
overall utilization of natural gas and oil will increase by 25% and 20% respectively in the next 25 
years (Harsem et al., 2011). Figure 1 shows a rise in the oil and gas demand for the upcoming 
years. 
 
              
Figure 1 Trends in oil and gas demand (Longwell, 2002) 
 
There is a dire need for the exploration of hydrocarbons due to the rising energy demands, high 
oil prices and concerns over energy security. In order to meet these demands successfully, the 
offshore petroleum industry is moving further north to the Arctic area. The Arctic Sea is a final 
destination for the hydrocarbon exploration and drilling. The Arctic Sea has enormous petroleum 
reserves amounting to almost 10% of the world’s known conventional petroleum resources.  
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Onshore oil production in the Arctic Sea began in the 1940s while offshore production started in 
the 1960s, but still, most of the Arctic areas including the Barents Sea are unexplored. US, 
Norway, Russia, Greenland and Canada are the main oil producing countries in the Arctic area 
(Shell, 2011a). All these countries encounter problems during exploration and production due to 
challenging environment of Arctic. The arctic and sub-arctic areas including the Barents Sea pose 
risks to life, assets and environment. The risks are due to the following factors: 
a) The harsh and extreme weather conditions such as icing, low temperature, darkness, 
polar lows 
b) The extra remoteness and long distance from shore 
c) Lack of infrastructure 
Norway is an oil producing country in the North Sea and the Barents Sea (part of the Arctic Sea). 
Norway has experienced some accidents which have occurred in the North Sea. The worst 
accident on the Norwegian sector of the North Sea occurred in 1980 when the flotel Alexander L. 
Kielland capsized and 123 people lost their lives. Snorre Alpha in 2004 is another accident in the 
Norwegian Sea but without any fatalities (Vinnem, 2011). If we talk about the helicopter 
accidents, then the most serious helicopter accident in the Norwegian sector took place in 1978 
when 18 people died. The last multi fatality accident in the North Sea occurred in July 1988 when 
Piper Alpha caught fire which was followed by uncontrolled release of gas causing 167 people to 
lose their lives (Tveit, 1994).  
 
The 2010 study about the trends in risk level in the Norwegian petroleum activities (PSAN, 2010) 
has shown both positive and negative trends. The trends reveal a sharp increase in the well 
control and gas leaks incidents however there were no fatal accidents on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf during the year. A positive trend has been shown for the helicopter accidents, 
ship collision accidents and the accidents resulting in serious personal injury. This shows that 
considerable attention is paid to the safety management and emergency preparedness in order to 
improve the trends in risk levels. 
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From the above facts and findings, it can be claimed that even if there have been offshore 
petroleum accidents in the past, the trends in the risk level on the Norwegian Continental Shelf 
have shown considerable improvement in the safety standards. This implies that the solutions to 
avoid and/or handle such accidents and emergency situations are in place and are continuously 
improving. Secondly, keeping in mind the harsh climatic conditions of the Arctic Sea as 
compared to the North Sea, the knowledge related to the past accidents in the North Sea do not 
provide a sufficient knowledge base in order to avoid future accidents in the Arctic Sea. 
 
The dimensioning of the emergency preparedness for accidents and incidents in the arctic and 
sub-arctic areas needs to take the location specific factors of the area into account in order to cope 
with the particular challenges related to the operations in the Arctic Sea including the Barents 
Sea.  
1.2 Objectives 
The objectives of this thesis are as follows:  
1. To provide an overview of offshore petroleum activity in arctic and sub-arctic areas 
around the world, emphasizing the areas comparable to the Barents Sea. 
2. To provide an overview of accidents/incidents that has occurred in these areas. 
3. To describe the main content of the emergency preparedness part of NORSOK Z-013 
standard and discuss the relationship between risk analysis and emergency preparedness 
analysis. Both revision 2 from 2001 and revision 3 from 2010 will be considered. 
4. To analyze the accidents/incidents with respect to the emergency preparedness handling 
of the accidents/incidents. 
5. To describe the emergency preparedness challenges for arctic and sub-arctic areas, 
including operation and maintenance of emergency preparedness equipment. 
1.3 Scope and Limitations 
The scope of the thesis is to provide information related to proactive emergency preparedness for 
accidents/incident in the offshore petroleum activity in arctic and sub-arctic areas. By “proactive”  
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we mean i) acting in advance to deal with an expected difficulty or ii) to be proactive by learning 
from the previous relevant experience. In this thesis, the latter meaning is used. The relevant 
emergency preparedness experience for the past accidents is analyzed in order to avoid accidents 
in the future. The thesis covers accidents/incidents in the arctic and sub-arctic areas including the 
Barents Sea which we have been able to account for. The accidents related to exploration and 
drilling of the hydrocarbons are covered in the thesis. The thesis also includes two major 
accidents in the Arctic Sea which does not fall under the umbrella of petroleum related accidents, 
but still may be useful for the dimensioning of emergency preparedness in the Arctic Sea.  
 
The main limitations of the thesis are i) availability and access to information about 
accidents/incidents in arctic and sub-arctic areas, ii) accidents/incidents due to transportation and 
storage of the hydrocarbons are not included, and iii) occupational accidents/incidents are 
excluded. 
1.4 Approach 
The approach used to solve the different tasks in the project includes a) a literature review on 
accident/incidents in arctic and sub-arctic sea areas, b) thorough reading of the NORSOK 
standard Z-013, and c) an extensive internet search. A detailed description of the approach for 
each research task is provided in Chapter 2. 
1.5 Report Structure 
The structure of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 presents detailed information on the methods 
and approaches to solve each project task.  Chapter 3 describes the normative reference for the 
analysis i.e. NORSOK Z-013 while Chapter 4 provides an overview of offshore petroleum 
activities and companies operating in arctic and sub-arctic area around the world. Chapter 5 
describes the accidents/incidents that have occurred in these areas. Chapter 6 describes the 
analysis of the accidents/incidents in the light of the NORSOK Z-013 standard. Chapter 7 
discusses the results of the analysis as well as the anticipated challenges for emergency 
preparedness in arctic and sub-arctic areas. Chapter 8 presents the conclusion for the 
dimensioning of emergency preparedness in the Arctic Sea and Barents Sea.  
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2. Methodology 
This chapter describes the method and approach in order to meet the objectives mentioned in 
Section 1.2. Figure 2 shows the relationship among the project tasks (yellow numbers) as well as 
the structure of the thesis (chapter numbers). 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Relationship among the project tasks 
 
The first project task about offshore petroleum activity in arctic and sub-arctic areas has been 
further divided into three sub tasks. The first sub task provides meteorological and geographical 
information about arctic and sub-arctic areas including the Barents Sea. The second sub task 
describes information about the offshore oil and gas companies operating in these areas. The last  
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sub task describes the offshore petroleum activities in the countries having border with the Arctic 
Sea. For all three sub tasks, extensive internet search was conducted. The keywords and 
derivatives related to each sub task are listed in Table 2. 
 
For the second project task related to overview of accidents/incidents in arctic and sub-arctic 
areas, extensive literature search was conducted. Most of the accident details relevant for the 
thesis were obtained from the internet. The websites of relevant oil and gas authorities were also 
reviewed in order to have in depth knowledge about the accidents/incidents. There might be other 
accidents taking place in the areas of arctic, but the accidents/incidents described in the thesis are 
the only ones which we have been able to find information about. The keywords and their 
derivatives for this task are listed in Table 2. 
 
The two revisions (2 and 3) of NORSOK Z-013 standard were studied in order to understand the 
structure of risk and emergency preparedness analysis in the third task (Figure 2). Both revisions 
were compared and contrasted in order to discuss the relationship between risk analysis and 
emergency preparedness analysis.  
 
The fourth task was related to the analysis of accidents/incidents with respect to the emergency 
preparedness handling of the accidents/incidents in arctic and sub-arctic areas. The input was 
taken from task two and three (Figure 2). The accidents/incidents were classified according to the 
defined situation of hazard and accident (DSHAs) and the phases of emergency preparedness 
mentioned in NORSOK Z-013. The emergency preparedness phases were only listed in the 
NORSOK Z-013 standard however the detailed description of the phases was obtained from the 
website of the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSAN). For simplicity, the list of DSHAs 
was subdivided into “major DSHAs” and “other DSHAs” for the master thesis. The list of major 
DSHAs was used for the classification of accidents/incidents in the Arctic Sea. Table 1 shows the 
structure for accident/incident analysis which was used in the thesis. 
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Table 1 Structure for accident/incident analysis 
 
EP Phases  
Major DSHAs 
 
Alert 
 
Danger 
limitation
 
Rescue 
 
 
Evacuation 
 
 
Normalization
 
1.       
2.        
3.       
.....      
 
After analyzing the accidents/incidents in the light of the emergency preparedness concepts and 
methods in task 4, different challenges for the emergency preparedness in arctic and sub-arctic 
areas were summarized in task 5. In addition, anticipated challenges about offshore drilling and 
production in arctic areas have been included which are based on extensive reading of relevant 
articles, conference papers and reports. The keywords used for search of information on the 
anticipated challenges in arctic areas are listed in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 Keywords and their derivatives for the project tasks 
Project tasks Keywords/search term Derivatives 
1. Offshore petroleum activity 
in arctic and sub-arctic 
areas. 
The Arctic Sea, sub arctic 
areas, the Barents Sea, oil 
and gas companies in the 
Arctic, petroleum activity. 
Climate, meteorological 
conditions, sea ice, Polar 
lows. 
2. Accidents/incidents in the 
arctic and sub-arctic areas. 
Accidents in the Arctic Sea, 
emergency preparedness 
reports for accidents in the  
In White Sea, in Kara Sea, oil 
leakage accidents, oil rig 
accidents. 
3. Emergency preparedness 
and risk analysis according 
to NORSOK Z-013. 
NORSOK Z-013 standard 
revision 2 and revision 3. 
Not applicable. 
4. Analysis of 
accidents/incidents in view of 
emergency preparedness 
Not applicable. Not applicable. 
5. Emergency preparedness 
challenges for arctic and sub-
arctic areas. 
Challenges for hydrocarbon 
drilling in the Arctic Sea. 
Rescue resources in the 
Arctic Sea. Technology 
challenges. 
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3. Normative Reference for Analysis 
The NORSOK standard Z-013, developed by the Norwegian petroleum industry, is about risk 
and emergency preparedness analysis. For this project, two revisions of the standard are 
considered. One is revision 2, 2001 while the other is revision 3, 2010. The standard contains 
requirements for effective planning, execution and use of qualitative risk analysis (QRA) and 
emergency preparedness analysis (EPA). It helps the industry by providing  
a) guidelines for establishing risk acceptance criteria,  
b) requirements to use QRA and EPA in different life cycle phases and  
c) a procedure for the planning and execution of this analysis.  
 
The QRA and EPA helps in the decision making process by selecting appropriate risk reducing 
measures and emergency preparedness plans for the safety of people, assets and environment. 
The standard does not cover occupational health, safety and environment aspects (NORSOK Z-
013, 2001, 2010). 
 
Revision 2 is only for offshore facilities (PNGIS.net, 2012a) while revision 3 is for both offshore 
and onshore production facilities of oil and gas (PNGIS.net, 2012b). Revision 3 has explicitly 
listed the normative and informative references while revision 2 has provided only a list of 
normative references. The most distinct difference between the two revisions is that revision 3 
has made an attempt to adapt to the structure and model of ISO 31000 (Risk management, 
principles and guidelines) with some exceptions. 
 
For the structuring and analysis of accidents/incidents in arctic and sub-arctic areas around the 
world, the different phases of emergency preparedness and DSHA used in the emergency 
preparedness analysis are presented and described in the following sections. 
 
In this thesis, if there are differences in the two revisions, this is explicitly stated. If not, this 
means that both the revisions provide similar information. 
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3.1 Emergency Preparedness Phases  
The NORSOK Z-013 standard list the following emergency preparedness phases:  
 Alert 
 Danger limitation (Combat) 
 Rescue 
 Evacuation 
 Normalization 
The NORSOK Z-013 standard does not elaborate the phases. However, Section 77 of the 
Activities Regulations and corresponding guidelines by the PSAN gives information about each 
phase. It says that, “in alert phase, the right notification is given immediately to the following 
organisations depending upon the situation:  
a) the facility's central control room or other central function, 
b) the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre 
c) one or more parts of the operator's emergency preparedness organization, 
d) the contractors' emergency preparedness organizations, 
e) other licensees and partners in the event of an agreement relating to coordinated 
emergency preparedness resources, or in the event of joint use of production and/or transport 
systems. 
The danger limitation phase describes the measures so that the hazardous situations should not 
develop into an accident situations. For the phase of rescue, personnel should be rescued during 
the accident situations by   
a) locating missing personnel using personnel control systems, 
b) bringing personnel to safe areas on vessels, facilities or land, 
c) giving injured personnel lifesaving first aid and medical treatment on their own facilities, 
the standby vessel or other facilities.  
The next phase of evacuation describes that the personnel on the facility should be evacuated 
quickly and efficiently at all times. The requirements relating to evacuation as mentioned in the  
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standard entails that the evacuation measures shall be of a nature that provides the highest 
possible probability that personnel can be evacuated from an exposed area to a safe area on the 
facility and, if applicable, to safe areas on vessels, other facilities or on land. As regards sick and 
injured personnel, the requirement implies that transport to the land-based health service takes 
place in a safe and prudent manner. It must be noted that the rescue of the personnel can occur 
before and after the phase of evacuation. 
 
The condition can be normalised when the development of a hazard and accident situation has 
been stopped, e.g. through monitoring and cleanup of the pollution and restoring the 
environment, thereby restoring the condition to its state before the hazard and accident situation. 
Criteria shall be set for normalisation of the external environment. The requirement relating to 
normalisation as mentioned in the standard also implies that 
a) injured or sick personnel are given the necessary treatment and care, such as medical 
treatment on land and follow-up of physical and psychological delayed injuries, and that 
the next of kin are provided with the necessary information, care and follow-up after 
major accidents,  
b) damage to the facility and reservoir is stabilized and corrected, 
c) the operation of the facility is resumed.” 
3.2 Defined Situations of Hazard and Accident 
Defined situations of hazard and accident (DSHA) are those selected hazardous and accidental 
events which can be used for the dimensioning of the emergency preparedness for a particular 
activity. DSHAs are important terms in the regulations by PSAN.  The Management Regulations, 
Section 15, mentions that the party responsible shall perform quantitative risk analysis associated 
with all sort of activities as well as identification of situations of hazards and accidents. The same 
requirements exist in relation to emergency preparedness. In the guidance document of the 
Management Regulations, it is compulsory for the parties to use NORSOK Z-013. According to 
NORSOK Z-013, DSHA should include three types of events/situations: 
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 Dimensioning accident event (DAE) usually defined on the basis of design accidental 
load (DAL) through quantitative risk assessment (QRA) 
 Minor accidental events 
 Situations associated with temporary increase of risk such as work over open sea, hot 
work, etc 
DSHAs can also include events which are comparable to the activity of interest and accidental 
events identified in the QRA but not identified as DAE which represent separate challenges for 
the emergency preparedness (NORSOK Z-013, 2001, 2010). 
 
The two revisions of NORSOK Z-013 describe almost the same DSHAs. In revision 2, we have a 
category of accident titled as “Hydrocarbon leaks, fire and explosion” which is similar to the 
accident category of “Process accidents” in revision 3. Revision 3 also lists utility systems and 
storage accidents while revision 2 does not discuss about them separately. In revision 3, the 
accidents due to ship collisions, falling and swinging loads and external impacts are merged into 
a category of “external impact” while in revision 2, each one of them are described in separate 
sections. The rest of the accidents are the same in both the revisions such as blowouts and 
helicopter accidents.  
 
There also exists a company-independent set of DSHAs used by PSAN in a project titled as 
“Trends in risk level (RNNP)” (Skjerve et al., 2008). The main purpose of this set was to provide 
a basis for calculating data on incidents/accidents on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. This set is 
somehow a general set of DSHAs and different companies adopt it differently according to their 
particular installations. The list of the DSHAs in RNNP and Skjerve et al., (2008) is divided in 
two categories (Table 3 and 4). Table 3 shows a list of DSHAs which can be used for accidents 
having major potential while Table 4 shows the other DSHAs which can be used for the 
emergency preparedness of accidents normally not having major accident potential. 
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Table 3 Major accident potential DSHAs   Table 4 Other DSHAs   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The list of DSHAs in Table 3 is simple and precise. Therefore, it is used in this thesis for the 
analysis of the accidents in arctic and sub-arctic sea around the world. 
3.3 Relationship between Risk Analysis and Emergency Preparedness 
Analysis 
Risk analysis (for example QRA) identifies the hazards and estimates the risk through 
quantification of probability and consequence of accidental events in such a way that the 
outcomes of the risk analysis can be compared to the risk acceptance criteria.   
 
 
 
13. Man overboard 
14. Serious injury to personnel 
15. Occupational illness 
16. Total power failure 
17. Control room out of service  
18. Diving accident 
19. H2S emissions  
20. Lost control of radio-active 
source 
21. Falling object 
22. Acute pollution 
23. Production halt 
24. Transport system halt 
1. Non-ignited hydrocarbon leaks 
2. Ignited hydrocarbon leaks 
3. Well kicks/loss of well control 
4. Fire/explosion in other areas, not 
hydrocarbons 
5. Vessel on collision course 
6. Drifting object 
7. Collision with field-related 
vessel/installation/shuttle tanker  
8. Structural damage to 
platform/stability/anchoring/ positioning 
failure  
9. Leaking from subsea production 
systems/pipelines/risers/flow 
lines/loading buoys/loading hoses  
10. Damage to subsea production 
equipment/pipeline systems/diving 
equipment caused by fishing gear 
11. Evacuation 
12. Helicopter crash/emergency landing 
on/near installation   
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The EPA process consists of the establishment of DSHAs, including major DAEs, establishment 
of performance requirements, and effectiveness analysis of identified measures, selection of 
solutions and establishment of an emergency preparedness plan (NORSOK Z-013, 2001, 2010). 
 
The two revisions of NORSOK Z-013 (revision 2 and 3) have different descriptions of the 
process of risk and emergency preparedness analysis. Therefore both the revisions of the standard 
will be described and discussed in the following sections.  
3.3.1 NORSOK Z­013 Revision 2 (2001) 
Figure 3 shows the relationship between risk analysis and emergency preparedness analysis in 
revision 2 of NORSOK Z-013. 
 
The information from the quantitative risk analysis provides input to the emergency preparedness 
analysis process. The information helps to establish a set of DSHAs and also includes 
assumptions which should be used when establishing the performance requirements. The 
performance requirements are established for each DSHA and structured according to the phases 
mentioned in Section 3.1. The next step in the EPA analysis identifies technical, operational and 
organizational measures to handle the DSHAs. This step is followed by the effectiveness analysis 
where the identified measures are recursively analyzed until a final solution is selected. The last 
two steps (Figure 3) of the emergency preparedness analysis process, “Select solution” and 
“Emergency preparedness action plan”, are not part of the EPA. 
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Figure 3 Risk analysis and emergency preparedness analysis (NORSOK standard Z-013, 
Revision 2 page 15) 
3.3.2 NORSOK Z­013 Revision 3 (2010) 
Figure 4 shows the relationship between risk analysis and emergency preparedness analysis in 
revision 3 of NORSOK Z-013. 
 
The most important aspect of revision 3 is that it has used almost the same structure, principles 
and model as used in ISO 31000. ISO 31000 is a risk assessment standard having elements of risk 
identification, risk analysis, risk evaluation and risk treatment. Further, it explicitly emphasizes 
on establishing a context prior to the risk assessment process. Besides this, the ISO 31000 has  
fsafsfsfsfsfs 
                                                     Proactive Emergency Preparedness in the Barents Sea  
 
Salma Basharat   15 
 
 
two separate processes which are conducted through out the entire process. The first process is 
the process of monitoring, review and update while the second is communication and 
consultation (ISO 31000, 2009).  
 
 
Figure 4 Risk analysis and emergency preparedness analysis (NORSOK standard Z-013, 
Revision 3 page 17) 
 
The NORSOK Z-013, revision 3 structure is similar to the ISO 31000 with a difference of the 
“risk treatment” element. The NORSOK standard does not include this element in the risk and 
emergency preparedness analysis process. It might be due to the fact that this risk element is part 
of the risk management process in the ISO 31000 and not part of the risk assessment process. For  
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both the risk and emergency preparedness assessment processes, it is necessary to establish the 
context of the assessment. 
 
The scope and criteria is defined to make both the processes suitable with respect to the intended 
objectives and purpose. In order to establish the DSHAs, the EPA takes information from the risk 
assessment process as well as the hazard identification process. Step 7 of communication and 
consultation intend to involve relevant stakeholders in order to improve the quality of the risk 
assessment process. Step 8 involves continuous monitoring of established context and updating 
of context and risk assessment process if required (Figure 4).   
 
The NORSOK Z-013 standard provides an adequate basis for the risk analysis and emergency 
preparedness analysis. Both the revisions (2 and 3) have unique structure for risk analysis and 
EPA which can be useful in different contexts. Revision 2 is more detailed and explicit about the 
risk analysis as well as emergency preparedness analysis while revision 3 is less exact with 
respect to input from QRA. 
 
 
If we compare Figure 3 and 4, we can find some differences between revision 2 and 3. In revision 
2, both risk and emergency preparedness assessment are two independent processes and 
emergency preparedness analysis process takes the input from the risk analysis process. In 
revision 3, the two processes are integrated and yet independent so that any one of them can be 
used when required.  
 
When both of the assessments have to be performed simultaneously, then risk and emergency 
preparedness analysis has to be coordinated because inputs and results from one process will be 
used for the other process. It can also be noted that revision 2 is explicit on DAEs and clearly 
depicts the composition of a DSHA while revision 3 does not elaborate the composition of 
DSHA. Furthermore, revision 2 is more exact on assumptions that might give performance 
requirements, whereas in revision 3, the assumptions and the DAEs are hidden in the process of 
establishing the risk picture.  
 
                                                     Proactive Emergency Preparedness in the Barents Sea  
 
Salma Basharat   17 
 
 
 
EPA 5 in Figure 4 is actually the combination of two processes; identify measures and effective 
analysis of measures, in Figure 3. Also, EPA 6 (Figure 4) is also combination of select solution 
and emergency preparedness action plan in Figure 3. Another difference between the two 
revisions is that Steps 3 (Establish DSHA and analysis course of events), Step 7 (Communication 
and consultation) and Step 8 (Monitoring, review and update) of revision 3 (Figure 4) are not 
present in revision 2 (Figure 3). 
                                                     Proactive Emergency Preparedness in the Barents Sea  
 
Salma Basharat   18 
 
4. Offshore Petroleum Activity in Arctic and Sub­Arctic Areas  
This chapter briefly explains the geographical and meteorological information about arctic and 
sub-arctic areas on the globe. Further, the information of oil and gas companies operating in this 
region is also recognized along with the exploration and production activities of oil and gas 
companies in the arctic and sub-arctic areas around the world. The information serves as a 
necessary input for the analysis and understanding of the accidents in these areas. 
4.1  Geographical and Meteorological Information about Arctic and Sub­
Arctic Areas 
The Arctic Sea (also known as the Arctic Ocean) located in the Northern Hemisphere (75° 00° N 
latitude and 00° 00° longitude) of the globe and partly covered by sea ice throughout the year, is 
the smallest and shallowest ocean as compared to the world’s five major oceans. The sea ice, 
formed when the sea water freezes, of the Arctic sea varies in thickness depending on the wind 
and ocean currents which can also compress the ice to form pack ice. The size of the sea is almost 
equal to the size of Russia having roughly a circular basin. The Arctic Sea is surrounded by the 
lands of North America, Greenland, and Eurasia and by a number of islands. The Arctic Sea 
includes the seas of Barents, Beaufort, Chukchi, East Siberian, Greenland, Kara, Laptev, White 
and Bays of Hudson and Baffin (ArcticOcean, 2012). The geographical location of the Arctic 
Ocean and its seas is shown in Figure 5.   
 
The general climatic condition of the Arctic Sea is characterized by dark nights, cold and stable 
weather conditions during winter time, and foggy weather and weak snow with cyclones in 
summer time. Maximum snow is normally encountered during the months of March or April 
making snow cover (20-50 cm) over the frozen ocean. Due to global warming, the average annual 
temperature of the Arctic region is 10-20 °C. Petroleum and gas are a few resources out of many 
which are abundant in this region (ArcticOcean, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     Proactive Emergency Preparedness in the Barents Sea  
 
Salma Basharat   19 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Geographical location of the Arctic Sea (ArcticOcean, 2012) 
 
The sub-arctic area is a geographical area just south of the Arctic Circle. It covers most of 
Canada, Alaska, Siberia, northern Mongolia and Scandinavia (includes kingdom of Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden). The sub-arctic region (50°N and 70°N latitude) is characterized by very 
cold winters (below -30°C) and short and warm summers (30°C) (SubArctic, 2012). 
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4.1.1 The Barents Sea 
The Barents Sea is located between 70 and 80ºN. It is connected with the Norwegian Sea from 
the west and to the Arctic Sea from the north (Figure 5). The average depth of the sea is 230 m. 
The sea is located north of Russia and Norway (Barents, 2012a). 
  
The general conditions of the weather in the Barents Sea are more stable throughout the year as 
compared to the weather conditions in the North Sea. The sea is dominated by the cyclones and 
strong wind storms that occur in the North Atlantic and then move into the Barents Sea. Strong 
winter winds usually strike the sea from the southwest. The wind speed in the Barents Sea 
decreases towards the east and north. Atmospheric lows and highs can affect the wind speeds and 
eventually change the iceberg drifts (Barents, 2012b; Røsnes, 2011). The average maximum wind 
speed at 10m above sea level is 26.6 m/s (Jacobsen, 2010). 
 
All Norwegian coastal areas are affected by polar lows (“a low pressure phenomenon which is 
normally generated during situations with outbreaks of cold arctic air over the sea”). The polar 
lows in the Barents Sea can develop rapidly within 12 to 24 hours of the time of formation and 
often vanish quickly. With the outbreak of a polar low, heavy snowfall occurs and the visibility 
becomes very poor.  
 
The ice condition varies in the Barents Sea. Most of the ice fields have thickness of 1 m. In the 
center of the sea, the ice may appear once every 4 years however pack ice can be seen more often 
in the northern part of the Barents Sea. The Barents Sea is also characterized by icing which is “a 
phenomenon where water or moisture at subfreezing temperatures freezes onto surfaces above 
sea level”. The icing on the vessels can occur from October to May. There are two types of icing 
in the sea. Sea spray icing is most common and can result in significant amount of ice on the 
vessels. The sea spray icing can occur when the temperature is below -2 °C and wind speed is 
greater than 11 m/s. Atmospheric icing occurs through snow, rain or super cooled droplets. The 
metrological conditions for atmospheric icing to occur are a) temperature between 0 and -20 °C  
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and b) wind speed less than 10 m/s. Atmospheric icing is harmless as compared to sea spray icing 
(Røsnes, 2011).  
 
The maximum and minimum average air temperatures in the Barents Sea are +4.4 °C and -7.7 °C 
respectively. In addition, the maximum air temperature near Goliat and Snøhvit (southwest) can 
be between 20 °C and 25 °C while the minimum range can be -15 °C to -20 °C. With regards to 
sea temperatures, then the maximum and minimum ranges in the southwest of the Barents Sea are 
10 °C to 12.5 °C and 2 °C to 4 °C respectively (Jacobsen, 2010).  
 
Currents are very local in the Barents Sea. There are two main current directions in the Barents 
Sea. In the southern part of the Barents Sea, the current moves towards east while in the northern 
part, it moves westward and southwards (Røsnes, 2011). Some of the currents in the Barents Sea 
are (Barents, 2012b): 
a) The North Cape current 
b) West Spitsbergen current 
c) Bear Island current 
d) East Spitsbergen current 
 
If we talk particularly about the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea, then there are some important 
results and findings by Det Norske Veritas (DNV), a global provider of services for managing 
risk. The Barents 2020 project by DNV has divided the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea in 
eight sub-areas according to the ice conditions (Figure 6). According to Rysst (2010):  
 ice and Metocean conditions vary in the Barents Sea, but are uniform within each 
numbered sub-area shown in Figure 6, 
 waves and winds are lower than in the North Sea and 
 the main difference from the North Sea is ice and icing. 
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Figure 6 Divisions of the Norwegian Barents Sea (Rysst, 2010) 
 
Sea ice, polar lows, wind chill and ice bergs are some of the key characteristics of the Barents 
Sea in Norway. The main characteristics of the Barents Sea (DNV, 2008) are summarized in 
Table 5.  
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Table 5 Main characteristics of the Barents Sea (based on DNV, 2008) 
Category Characteristics Description  
Physical 
Environment 
Sea spray ice Ice created from sea water having different types thereby 
generating different ice loads. 
Wind chill  Common in Barents sea when strong winds combine with 
low temperatures. 
Icebergs Mostly tabular icebergs (steep sides with a flat top), iceberg 
mass may exceed 2 million tons; a number of icebergs just 
off the coasts of Finnmark in Northern Norway were 
observed in 1881 and 1929. 
Light/dark 
climate 
Limited visibility and difficult working conditions especially in 
winter. 
Cold Extremely low temperatures creating polar lows in the area. 
Polar lows can have implications of heavy snowfall, rise of 
wind speed and wave heights and low visibility due to heavy 
snowfall. 
Human 
Environment 
Remote and 
limited access 
Difficult in situations when there is heavy precipitation and 
fog. 
Lack of 
improved 
infrastructure 
New area for hydrocarbons resources therefore shortage of 
resources and infrastructure in the area.  
 
4.2 Oil and Gas Companies Operating in Arctic and Sub­Arctic Areas 
There are a number of oil and gas companies operating in the respective areas of the Arctic Sea. 
This section gives a brief overview of those companies which we have been able to account for.  
Furthermore, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) has also awarded licenses to particular 
companies for the exploration and production of oil and gas in the Norwegian side of the Barents 
Sea. The awards given in the 21st licensing round (MPE, 2011) are shown in Figure 7. Figure 7 
shows the information about the companies and their share in different zones of the Barents Sea. 
The description about these companies is also provided in Section 4.2. 
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Figure 7 Licenses awarded to the companies in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea (MPE, 
2011) 
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4.2.1 Statoil  
Statoil (a Norwegian state-owned company) has been involved in the exploration of 
hydrocarbons in the Barents Sea since 1980, the same year when the Norwegian government 
opened the sea for exploration. The company has almost 40 years of offshore experience in the 
exploration of oil and gas in the severe weather conditions of Norway. Statoil having strong 
competence, new technologies and strong values is capable to have strong hold even in other 
Arctic regions of Russia, Canada, Greenland and USA (Nygård, 2011). Statoil has been the 
operator for more than 60 out of 80 wells drilled in the southern Barents Sea (Statoil, 2011). 
 
In Norway, Statoil has recently discovered both oil and gas in the Havis prospect with an 
estimate of 200-300 million of oil equivalents. This is Statoil’s second discovery in less than a 
year (Adams, 2012). Another discovery of oil field in 2011 on the Skrugard prospect in the 
Barents Sea is also done by Statoil along with other companies. There are estimates of 150–250 
million recoverable oil equivalents from this field (Statoil, 2011). In addition, Statoil has found 
the reserves of oil and gas in the Obesum area of the Barents Sea in 2008 and 2009 (Statoil, 2008, 
2009). Further, the first offshore development of Snøhvit gas field in the Barents Sea was also 
conducted by Statoil. Statoil is a major operator of Snøhvit gas field with a share of 33.53% 
(Statoil, 2007). 
 
In the Russian sector of the Barents Sea, Statoil has participated in exploration drilling activity in 
the 1990s, and is taking part in the development of the gigantic Stockman gas field in the Barents 
Sea along with other oil and gas companies. 
 
In Canada, Statoil is mostly active in the sub-arctic areas offshore Newfoundland (a Canadian 
province in the eastern part of Canada). Statoil is involved in the fields of Terra Nova, Hibernia 
and Hebron as well as the Southern extension of Hibernia. The company also made a discovery 
of its own in the Mizzen prospect in 2009 (Statoil, 2012).  
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Finally, Statoil is considering participation in Greenland as well as in Alaska. The authorities of 
these two countries plan to conduct exploration of hydrocarbons and other resources in their 
respective Arctic part with the help of Statoil (Norheim, 2010). 
4.2.2 Eni Norge  
Eni Norge is part of the Italian energy company Eni. The company has exploration and 
production activities in all three parts of the Norwegian Continental Shelf including the Barents 
Sea since 1965 (Eni, 2012a). The company discovered the important field of Goliat in 2000 and 
has recently received the operator license for this oil field. The operator of the Goliat field is Eni 
Norway AS (65%) together with partner Statoil (35%). The development of Goliat, whose 
production will start in 2013, will be the first development of an oil field in the Norwegian sector 
of the Barents Sea. The Goliat FPSO (Floating Production Storage and Off-loading vessel) is 
currently under construction while the drilling of 22 wells will start in the autumn of 2012 (Eni, 
2012b). Besides this, Eni Norge has an interest share in the Havis well of 30% and Statoil is the 
operator in this field. Eni Norge plans to explore the Barents Sea further in year 2012. So far, Eni 
Norge has Havis, Goliat and Skrugard in their portfolio making it their 30 year perspective on the 
Barents Sea (Eni, 2012c). Another achievement of Eni Norge as an operator is in the Norwegian 
Sea at the field of Marulk. The production drilling has started at this gas field with the help of 
Statoil and will continue till first quarter of 2012 (Eni, 2012d). 
4.2.3 Gazprom 
Gazprom, mainly a gas company having 50,002% stake in the hands of the Russian government, 
is the world’s largest gas company doing all sort of activities ranging from exploration to 
marketing (RussianInfoCentre, 2007). The company controls 16% of the world’s gas reserves and 
is operating in different regions of the world including the Arctic Continental Shelf. Apart from 
other countries around the globe, the European Union is also getting almost 25% of the gas from 
this largest Russian company (Lesikhina et al., 2007).  
 
Sevmorneftegaz, a subsidiary company of Gazprom, is an operator involved in the exploration of 
oil and gas fields on the continental shelf of the Arctic Ocean. Sevmorneftegaz owns the licenses  
                                                     Proactive Emergency Preparedness in the Barents Sea  
 
Salma Basharat   27 
 
 
to develop the Prirazlomnoe oil field in the Pechora Sea and the Stockman gas condensate field in 
the Barents Sea (Bellona, 2007). Gazprom along with Total (a French company) and Statoil has 
created the Stockman Development AG Company for the development of the Stockman gas field 
(Gazprom, 2012a). In addition, Gazprom also holds the entire gas pipeline infrastructure in 
Russia. In February 2012, the federal government of Russia approved another license to Gazprom 
for the area located to the west of the Stockman field (Gazprom, 2012b). 
4.2.4 Rosneft 
Rosneft is another Russian oil company, allowed to operate in the waters of the Arctic 
Continental Shelf on the Russian side. It also operates in different locations of Russia. Rosneft 
holds in total proved hydrocarbon reserves of 22.8 billion barrels of oil equivalents 
(RussianInfoCentre, 2007). Rosneft signed an alliance project with BP in 2011 where the 
companies decided to build an Arctic technology center to investigate the safe exploration and 
production of hydrocarbons in the Arctic Continental Shelf. Rosneft have signed a joint venture 
with ExxonMobil (a US Company) for the exploration of hydrocarbons in the Kara Sea (Rosneft, 
2012).  
4.2.5 Chevron 
Chevron is one of the world's leading integrated energy companies, with subsidiaries that conduct 
business worldwide (Chevron, 2011a). This company has substantial business activities of the oil, 
gas and geothermal exploration, production, refining, marketing and sales etc in different 
countries including Norway (Chevron, 2011b). Most of the crude oil production by Chevron 
comes from the offshore Hibernia Field in Canada. Chevron has extended its exploration 
opportunities in northern, western and eastern Canada (Chevron, 2011c).  
4.2.6 Shell 
Shell is a global oil and gas company operating in over 90 countries and producing around 
3.1 million barrels of oil equivalents per day (Shell, 2012). Shell has been involved in the Arctic 
part of USA and Canada for almost 50 years. Shell has been very active in the exploration 
activities in the Beaufort Sea and the Chukchi Sea in USA. Further, Shell is mostly involved in  
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gas projects in the Canadian part of the Arctic Sea. In Russia, Shell is involved in a massive 
integrated oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) project of Sakhalin II. Sakhalin II has increased 
Shell’s global LNG production drastically. The Salym project is another developing oil field 
project in the sub-arctic area of Western Siberia. 160,000 barrels of oil production a day was 
achieved from this field in April 2009. In Norway, Shell is involved in oil and gas fields south of 
Arctic Circle. Shell is in the assessment phase of oil and gas development in the Arctic region 
(Shell, 2011a). 
4.2.7 Total  
Total is a French multinational oil company whose business ranges from oil and gas exploration 
to marketing and trading of oil and gas products. Considering the exploration activities by Total, 
different reserves of oil and gas are discovered in the countries of Europe, Africa, America and 
Middle East. In Europe, most of the reserves are found in Norway and UK (Total, 2010). Total 
partnered with Statoil is involved in the Kharyaga field and Stockman gas field in the Russian 
part of the Barents Sea (Norheim, 2010). 
4.2.8 ConocoPhillips  
It is an American multinational oil and gas company ranked as fifth largest private sector energy 
cooperation in the entire world. After Gazprom, this US owned company is second largest Arctic 
producer (Nelder, 2009). In the Canadian part of the Barents Sea, ConocoPhillips is involved in 
the Mackenzie Delta, the Beaufort Sea and the Arctic Islands (ConocoPhillips, 2011). 
ConocoPhillips started operating in Norway in the 1960s. The company discovered Ekofisk oil 
field in the Norwegian North Sea in 1969. With the passage of time, the company expanded its 
business in different areas of Norway. The company is also taking part in the offshore petroleum 
activities in the Barents Sea. The company has received the license in the Barents Sea that holds 
the Caliente and Borch prospect. ConocoPhillips in a major operator with a share of 50% in the 
Caliente prospect (MPE, 2011).  
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4.2.9 Lundin Petroleum  
Lundin Petroleum is a Swedish oil exploration and production company with its projects running 
in different geographical locations around the globe. The company has proven and probable 
reserves of 211 million barrels of oil equivalent (Lundin, 2012a). Lundin Norway AS is a 
subsidiary company of Lundin Petroleum. The company has been awarded 10 exploration 
licenses in the North Sea, Norwegian Sea and Barents Sea. Two out of ten licenses are awarded 
in the Barents Sea during the 21st Norwegian Licensing Round (Lundin, 2012b). In one of the 
licenses, Lundin is a major operator with a share of 40% while in the second, the interest share is 
20% (Lundin, 2011a). Lundin Norway AS has also completed drilling of Skalle well which is a 
gas discovery in the south western part of the Barents Sea (Lundin, 2011b). 
4.2.10 GDF Suez E&P 
GDF Suez E&P Norge is an affiliate of GDF Suez. The company is present in Norway for the 
last 11 years. The company asset portfolio is expanding as the company is involved in the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf and the Barents Sea. The company, after Statoil, has the most 
awarded operatorship in the Barents Sea (Suez, 2011). The company has recently drilled an 
exploration well (Heilo) in the area of the Barents Sea while it also had an appraisal well in 2006 
on Tornerose in the Barents Sea (Suez, 2012). As a result of the 21st licensing round, the 
company is awarded three operator licenses in the Barents Sea (Figure 7). 
4.2.11 Dong E&P 
Dong E&P is part of Dong Energy group headquartered in Denmark. Dong energy group is 
involved in the activities of procurement, production, and distribution and trading of energy in 
Northern Europe. Dong E&P is only involved in the exploration and production of hydrocarbons 
on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. The company is major operator in two sub sea projects 
(Trym and Oselvar) and partner in five producing fields on the Norwegian Continental Shelf 
(Dong, 2012). The company has been recently awarded a production license in the Barents Sea 
(Figure 7). 
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4.2.12 Arktikmorneftegazrazvedka 
The Russian company Arktikmorneftegazrazvedka (AMNGR) started oil and gas exploration 
activities on the Pechora Sea shelf in 1981. So far, the company has discovered 15 oil and gas 
fields on the Barents, Kara and Pechora Sea shelf. AMNGR also produces hydrocarbons raw 
materials on the Peschanoozerskoye field at Kolguev Island in the Barents Sea. The company has 
extended the hydrocarbon related activities in Europe, Africa and South- East Asia (AMNGR, 
2012a).  
 
The above mentioned companies are operating nowadays in Norway, US, Russia and Canada. 
However, in Greenland, the offshore petroleum production in the Barents Sea has not started yet 
therefore information about operating companies in Greenland is not provided in Section 4.2. 
  
The information about the operating oil and gas companies in the Barents Sea is summarized in 
Table 6. 
Table 6 List of companies operating in the Arctic Sea 
Company 
Name 
Project/Prospect Norway Russia Canada USA
Statoil Havis, Skrugard, Snøhvit, Obesum 
Stockman field  
Terra Nova, Hibernia, Hebron 
fields and Mizzen prospect 
X  
X 
 
 
X 
 
Eni Norge Goliat, Havis, Skrugard   X    
Gazprom Pririazlomnoe  and Stockman   X   
Rosneft Exploration in the Kara Sea, Arctic 
Technology Centre (project) 
  
X 
  
Chevron Hibernia field (Canada)   X  
Shell The Beaufort and Chukchi Sea  
Sakhalin II, Salym  
  
X 
 X 
Total Kharyaga and Stockman   X   
Conoco 
Phillips 
Caliente and Borch prospect  
The Mackenzie Delta, the Beaufort 
X   
X 
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Sea and Arctic Islands  
Lundin 
Petroleum 
PL 609 (Figure 5) and Skalle well  X    
GDF Suez 
E&P 
Heilo and Tornerose well 
PL 607, 610, 612 (Figure 5) 
X    
Dong E&P PL 613 (Figure 5) X    
Arktikmorn
eftegazraz
vedka 
Peschanoozerskoye field and 15 
fields of hydrocarbons in different 
areas. 
 X   
 
4.3 Offshore Petroleum Activities in Different Countries  
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) has presented the estimates of Arctic 
proved hydrocarbon reserves (Table 7) in different countries (AMAP, 1998).  
Table 7 Estimates of the Arctic proved hydrocarbon reserves 
Country Proved reserves 
(x 106 m3) 
Yearly production 
(x 106 m3) 
Undiscovered, 
recoverable oil          
(x 106 m3) 
Canada 21  1.3  1701  
United States 915  90  3630  
Russia (Tyumen 
Oblast only) 
15700  274  ------- 
Nordic countries 440  2  695  
Offshore oil and gas exploration and production in arctic and sub-arctic areas started in the 1920 
but the activities were slow. Nowadays, the exploration and production of hydrocarbons is at 
much faster pace in the Arctic Sea as compared to the past. Figure 8 shows major areas of oil and 
gas development and potential developments in the Arctic Sea (AMAP, 1998).  
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Figure 8 Major areas of oil and gas development and potential development in the Arctic Sea 
(AMAP, 1998) 
The following sub section describes the offshore hydrocarbon activities in the Arctic Sea of 
Russia, Norway, Canada, Greenland and US. 
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4.3.1 Offshore Petroleum Activity in Russia 
According to Koivurova and Hossain (2008), abundant oil and gas reserves (equivalent to 100 
billion tons of oil) for Russia are located in the Arctic Sea. About 70 trillion cubic feet of gas is 
estimated to be buried under the soils of the Barents, Pechora and Kara Seas. The Barents Sea, 
alone accounts for 22.7 billion tons of oil and gas. The oil and gas activities in Russia may start 
in the Prirazlomnoe oil field, the Medynsko-Varandey area, and the Kolokolmor and Pomor area. 
Prirazlomnoe oil field, located in the Russian Arctic Continental shelf, is the pilot oil field and is 
a source of attraction for oil and gas companies who intend to operate in the Arctic Sea. The 
Medynsko-Varandey area is located in the south-eastern part of the Barents Sea while the 
Kolokolmor and Pomor area are located in the southern part of the Pechora Sea. An estimate of 
300 million tons of oil is made which can be extracted from the Kolokolmor and Pomor area 
(Koivurova & Hossain, 2008). According to AMNGR (2012a), fifteen different fields on the 
Barents, Pechora and Kara Sea shelf are:  
1. Four oil fields (Prirazlomnoye, Varandey-more, Medynskoye-more and Dolginskoye) 
2. One oil and gas-condensate (Severo-Gulyaevskoye) 
3. Five gas condensate (Pomorskoye, Shtokmanovskoye, Rusanovskoye, 
Leningradskoye and Ledovoye) 
4. Five gas fields (Murmanskoye, Severo-Kildinskoye, Ludlovskoye, Severo-
Kamennomysskoye and Kamennomysskoye- more) 
4.3.2 Offshore Petroleum Activity in Norway 
Norway has abundant reserves of oil (10.2 billion barrels) and gas while on average 
approximately 3 million barrels of oil is produced every day and is exported to the markets of 
UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the US. When it comes to the Norwegian Arctic Sea, 
oil and gas activities are only limited to the Barents Sea (Koivurova & Hossain, 2008). It is 
estimated that 7 billion barrels of oil equivalents are present in the Norwegian part of the Barents 
Sea which is almost equal to the sale value of NOK 3000 billion (Norheim, 2010). The Barents 
Sea has so far 90 exploration and appraisal wells and most of them are in the Hammerfest Basin  
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(Nygård, 2011). 39 production licenses and 61 exploration wells have been awarded in the 
Norwegian Arctic sector since 1980. The first gas field of Snøhvit (by Statoil) was discovered in 
1984 while in 2000 the oil field of Goliat (by Eni Norge) was discovered. It is said that Goliat 
field has reserves of 240 million barrels in oil equivalent (CTV, 2011). Reserves of oil has also 
been found in the Havis prospect with an estimate of 200-300 million of oil equivalents as well as 
in the Skrugard prospect of the Barents Sea with an estimate of 250 million recoverable oil 
equivalents in this field (Adams, 2012). The reserves of oil and gas in the Obesum area of the 
Norwegian Barents Sea were also discovered in 2008 and 2009 (Statoil, 2008, 2009).  
4.3.3 Offshore Petroleum Activity in Canada 
According to the estimates made in January 2008 by Oil and Gas Journal (OGJ), 179 billion 
barrels of oil reserves are present in Canada.  The first Arctic well in Canada was drilled in 1961-
62 and the oil exploration and production continued till date. Currently, three oil fields namely 
Terra Nova (300-400 million barrels oil), White Rose (250 million barrels oil) and Hibernia (615 
million barrels oil) are in operation in the part of the Arctic belonging to Canada (Koivurova & 
Hossain, 2008).  
4.3.4 Offshore Petroleum Activity in Greenland 
Some of the Greenland Basins and provinces have more than 50 trillion cubic feet of natural gas 
(Harsem et al., 2011). The exploration of hydrocarbons in Greenland started in the beginning of 
the 1970s in Greenland. Different areas were drilled in the following years but oil was found only 
in the well of Kangâmiut – 1 and on the peninsula of Nuuussuaq by a Canadian company. The 
offshore petroleum activity in Greenland is moving forward gradually and it is hoped that 
hydrocarbons will be found in the area (Koivurova & Hossain, 2008).  
4.3.5 Offshore Petroleum Activity in US 
Most of the hydrocarbon production in Alaska (US) is in the Prudhoe Bay area. Three major oil 
fields in this area are Endicott, Point McIntyre and Northstar oil fields. The Endicott oil field is 
connected to onshore Prudhoe Bay oil field while the Point Macintyre oil field produces oil from 
the East Dock off the Prudhoe Bay oil field. The Endicott oil field contained 582 million barrels  
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which is greater than the containment of oil (400 million barrels) in the Point McIntyre oil field. 
The Northstar oil field started production in 2001 presently producing 65,000 barrels a day. The 
oil from this field is transported through pipelines which are buried very deep to minimize the 
effects of ice (Koivurova & Hossain, 2008). 
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5. Accidents in Arctic and Sub­Arctic Areas 
This chapter describes briefly the accidents/incidents in the arctic and sub-arctic areas which we 
have been able to account for. The section includes two categories of accidents. The first category 
includes accidents related to offshore petroleum operations whereas the second category includes 
the accidents which are not related to the oil and gas industry. Table 8 shows the list of offshore 
petroleum related accidents/incidents. 
 
Table 8 List of accidents/incidents in arctic and sub-arctic areas 
Name Location Type Year 
Qugruk 2 Well Blowout Accident USA (Alaska) Blowout 2012 
Kolskaya Rig Accident Russia Capsize 2011 
Alaska Oil Spill Accident USA (Alaska) Pipeline leak 2006 
Nefterudovoz-57 Accident Russia Ship collision 2003 
Usinsk Accident Russia Pipeline leak 1994 
 
5.1 Qugruk 2 Well Blowout Accident   
A North Slope (a region of Alaska bordering with the Arctic Circle) oil well blew in the Alaska 
Arctic oil fields on 15th February 2012. The well hit a natural gas pocket at about 2,500 feet and 
the blowout resulted in the release of high pressurized gas and caused 42,000 gallons of drilling 
mud to set on ice pad and rig. The gas was vented through a gas diverter. 
 
It is said that the gas pocket at Qugruk 2 was overlooked by operating company (Repsol), and 
lead to this unwanted event (DeMarban, A., 2012a, 2012b). 
 
Luckily there were no injuries, explosion or oil spill. The Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation 
Commission withdrew drilling permits from Respol for the other two wells, Qugruk 1 and 4.  
Repsol was asked to reapply for the permits. 
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Figure 9 South end of the well pad where Qugruk 2 well blowout took place (DeMarban, A., 
2012b) 
 
During the emergency operation, all the ignition sources were shut down and the workers were 
evacuated safely. The responsible company, Respol, followed its contingency plans accurately. 
The sudden release of gas from Qugruk 2 stopped flowing within a day and half because the 
underground gas pocket was small. The well was cemented and closed on 17th March 2012. 
Respol has cleaned and removed 2,189 barrels of liquid from the site while the cleanup work on 
the rig and well pad continued for several weeks. The cold weather hampered the cleaning 
process.  Furthermore, 2363 cubic yards of solid waste is also removed from the accident location 
(DeMarban, A., 2012a, 2012b). 
5.2 Kolskaya Rig Accident 
A Russian drilling rig named Kolskaya capsized on 18th December 2011 and sank within 20 
minutes in the Okhotsk Sea. The accident took place at around 2:00 GMT, at the temperature of   
-17 °C. The rig sank in the sea while it was being towed to a new location during a storm. The 
platform capsized before the crew could get to their rescue rafts (Wade, 2011). 
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Figure 10 Kolskaya rig sank in December 2011 (Wade, 2011) 
 
Ice and waves damaged the rig and caused water to enter in the vessel thereby causing the rig to 
sink (Kireeva & Kaminskaya, 2011). The oil and gas company AMNGR was responsible for the 
rig and according to Kireeva and Kaminskaya (2011) most of the victims were drilling specialists 
and not ordinary workers. The company’s higher officials claim that the people on board were 
highly experienced as well as trained for the rescue drills. Further, the technical condition of the 
rig was also adequate. It is also said that the staff was forced to take the rig to the desired location 
even though it was bad weather. The company would have faced a loss if the towing process had 
to be delayed till February 2012. 
 
The accident caused confirmed deaths of 16 people and 37 people could not be found. It is also 
believed that since the rig was towed and was not involved in drilling operations there cannot 
have been any major oil spill as a result of the accident (Kireeva & Kaminskaya, 2011). 
 
During the emergency operation, the first distress signal was sent to the rescue organization. The 
rescue workers saved the lives of 14 people on board with the help of planes, helicopters, and 
rescue vessel while the search for missing people was hampered due to sub-zero temperatures. 
The area was searched by the helicopters and planes (Ponomareva, 2011). 
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5.3 BP Alaska Oil Spill Accident 
The largest oil spill on Alaska's North Slope occurred in February 2006 and was discovered in 
March 2006 at a pipeline owned by BP Exploration, Alaska (BPXA) in western Prudhoe Bay. 
Almost 653 tons of oil spilled over an area of 1.9 acres from a hole corroded in a pipeline.  
 
 
Figure 11 A worker cleaning up after Alaska oil spill (Barringer, 2006) 
 
 
Less budget allocation for corrosion-fighting, ignorance to four leak detection alarms, too few 
corrosion monitoring staff and insufficient level of corrosion inhibitor were some of the causes 
which resulted in the massive oil spill (Wikipedia, 2012). 
 
As a result of this accident, thick black crude oil seeped into the snow and spread across two 
acres. Due to negligence for the discharge of the oil, BP Exploration was also fined US 20 
million dollars. BP suffered major image and financial loss. Further, the discovery of 10 km of 
corroded pipeline also caused shutdown of Prudhoe Bay oil field (Alaska, 2012).  
 
                                                     Proactive Emergency Preparedness in the Barents Sea  
 
Salma Basharat   40 
 
 
 
BPXA immediately activated the response contractor and incident management team. Two EPA 
coordinators were mobilized to the Prudhoe Bay. A committee was also formed to handle the 
media.  The clean up operation was completed in May, 2006 with the help of vacuum trucks and 
the contaminated snow and oiled tundra was also removed (ARRT, 2006). The site was further 
covered with frozen tundra taken from some other site (Alaska, 2008). The emergency and rescue 
teams faced difficulties in the cleaning of the oil due to very cold weather and therefore it took 
considerable time for the clean up. The corroded pipeline was later replaced with a new flow line 
(Roach, 2006).  
5.4 Nefterudovoz­57 Accident 
In 2003, a storage tanker (Nefterudovoz-57) in the White Sea was dented by another boat while it 
was trying to moor to the other storage tanker. As a result of this collision, the oil started to leak 
and it was noticed on the fourth day by local population.  
 
The causes of the accident are not known. However, the fishermen and the birds were the 
immediate victims of the oil leakage. The responsible company, Volgotanker, was also fined to 
pay 12 million rubles but the company is fighting its case in the court. 
 
There was lack of coordination in the plan for cleaning the oil spill. The false information about 
the spill and clean up operation by the company misled the emergency services and caused a 
huge damage to the animals at the coast (Lesikhina et al., 2007).  
5.5 Usinsk Accident 
An oil leakage accident (1994) in Russia caused almost 100,000-120,000 tones of oil leakage in 
the Vozey-Golovnie pipeline which is south of the Arctic Circle. The oil spread across vast areas 
of tundra and marshland. The spill was much larger as compared to the 37,000 tones of oil spilled 
in Exxon Valdez accident (Wikipedia, 2012).  
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The pipeline was brought in use for the first time in 1975 and was never maintained and repaired 
until the time when the accident happened.  
 
Figure 12 Usinsk Accident (Francis, 1994) 
 
Almost 115 hectares of tundra were contaminated effecting fishery as well as local people. The 
number of fish sharply declined in the area while inhabitants developed problems in their 
immune systems. Further, the oil was discarded in the areas where the cattle grazed thereby 
causing plague in the animals after some time. The responsible company, Komineft, was also 
fined 600,000 USD. 
 
The clean-up operation in Usinsk covered in excess of 400 hectares of oil. The emergency 
response teams had set fire to the spilled oil in order to avoid further spread (Lesikhina et al., 
2007). 
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5.6 Other Accidents 
There are a few other accidents in the Arctic Sea which are not related to oil and gas activities but 
still can be useful in terms of emergency preparedness dimensioning in the Arctic Sea. It includes 
Maxim Gorky accident (1989) and the Kursk explosion (2000). 
 
a) Maxim Gorky Accident 
One of the accidents was on 19th June 1989 when a vessel in the Arctic Sea hit an iceberg in the 
Greenland Sea, north of Norway. The accident took place at 23:05 and the Maxim Gorky (Soviet 
cruise ship) had 953 people out of which 378 were crew members. The weather conditions were 
good. There were no wind and major wave swells when the crew discovered ice and wanted to 
show it to the passengers. As the vessel moved closer, the Maxim Gorky collided with the 
iceberg resulting in rips in the hull and the bow of the ship.   
 
A rescue vessel, Senja, arrived next day at 4:15 while the accident occurred at 23:05. The call for 
assistance as well as the ongoing situation on Maxim Gorky was received through radio 
communication by the rescue team. All the passengers were rescued but some of the rescue 
workers got small injuries (Lohr, 1989).  
 
b) Kursk Explosion 
Another famous accident was on 12th August 2000 when a Russian nuclear submarine, Kursk, 
exploded and sank in the Russian Barents Sea. The accident took place north-east of Murmansk 
about 250 km from Norway. The two explosions took place with a difference of three minutes 
causing 118 men on board to die along with the sinking of the submarine.  
 
The first message from the rescue centre of northern Norway in Bodø was received by 
Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NPRA) on 14th August 2000 at 09:50. NPRA 
declared emergency preparedness at 10:40 and the crisis committee for nuclear accidents was  
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activated. On the same day at about 16:30 NPRA received a confirmation from Russian 
authorities about the accident. The reactors in the submarine were shut down immediately. An 
expedition consisting of Norwegian and Russian personnel was sent from 17th to 22nd August 
2000 to open the rescue hatches in the submarine compartment. The main aim of the expedition 
was to rescue the workers if they were still alive. However, none of the crew on board was alive. 
Further, there was no radioactive leakage after the accident (Amundsen et al., 2001). 
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6. Accident Analysis and Results  
This chapter describes the results of the analysis of the petroleum accidents and the related 
emergency preparedness experience using the NORSOK Z-013 standard for structuring and 
classification of information. 
 
Table 9 presents the classification of the accidents (described in Section 5.1 – 5.5) according to 
the emergency preparedness phases described in Section 3.1 and the DSHAs introduced in 
Section 3.2 (Table 3). 
 
The main findings and results are as follows: 
 
1. The number of accidents in arctic and sub-arctic areas is quite small, i.e. only 5 accidents in 18 
years. This limited number of accidents eventually provides a scarce knowledge base with 
respect to emergency response. 
 
2. The accidents in the Arctic Sea are scattered both with respect to time period and location. The 
most recent accident took place this year (2012) in the Alaskan Arctic oil fields while the first 
accident (in 1994) occurred in the Russian Arctic Sea. 
 
3. Most of the accidents (3 out of 5) took place in the Russian Arctic Sea while two of the 
accidents took place in Alaska. There were no accidents in the Norwegian, Canadian or 
Greenland Arctic Sea. 
 
4. Only the Kolskaya Rig accident (2011) resulted in the loss of human lives as the rig capsized 
due to stability failure and rough weather. The Alaska oil spill accident (2006) and Usinsk 
accident (1994) were of type pipeline leak and resulted in oil spills. Similarly the Qugruk 2 
blowout accident (2012) and Nefterudovoz-57 ship collision accident (2003) also had 
environmental related consequences. 
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5. There are single accidents related to DSHA 3 (well kick), DSHA 7 (vessel collision) and 
DSHA 8 (structural damage) while two accidents are related to DSHA 9 (leaking from 
pipeline). None of the accidents were related to DSHA 1-2, 4-6 and 10-12.  
 
6. All of the five accidents provide information about the emergency preparedness phase alert 
and normalization. 
 
7. The emergency phase rescue and evacuation are not applicable to three of the accidents 
(Alaska oil spill, Nefterudovoz-57, Usinsk accident). These accidents resulted mainly in oil 
spills with no need for rescue or evacuation of people.  
 
8. Most of the emergency operations conducted in relation to the accidents faced challenges due 
to the harsh climatic conditions in the areas of the Arctic Sea. 
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Table 9 Classification of accidents according to major DSHAs 
 
EP Phases  
 
Major DSHAs 
 
Alert 
 
 
Danger 
limitation
 
 
Rescue 
 
 
Evacua-
tion 
 
 
Normal-
ization 
 
1. Non-ignited hydrocarbon 
leaks 
     
2. Ignited hydrocarbon leaks       
3. Well kicks/loss of well 
control 
Qugruk 2 
(5.1) 
Qugruk 2 
(5.1) 
Qugruk 2 
(5.1) 
Qugruk 2 
(5.1) 
Qugruk 2 
(5.1) 
4. Fire/explosion in other 
areas, not hydrocarbons 
     
5. Vessel on collision course      
6. Drifting object      
7. Collision with field-related 
vessel/installation/shuttle 
tanker  
Nefterudov
oz-57 (5.4) 
Not known Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Nefterudov
oz-57 (5.4) 
8. Structural damage to 
platform/stability/anchoring/ 
positioning failure  
Kolskaya 
Rig (5.2) 
Not known Kolskaya   
Rig (5.2) 
Kolskaya 
Rig (5.2) 
Kolskaya 
Rig (5.2) 
9. Leaking from subsea prod-
uction systems/pipelines/ 
risers/flow lines/loading 
buoys/loading hoses 
BP Alaska 
Oil Spill 
(5.3) 
Usinsk 
(5.5) 
Not known Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
BP Alaska 
Oil Spill 
(5.3) 
Usinsk 
(5.5) 
10. Damage to subsea prod-
uction equipment/pipeline 
systems/diving equipment 
caused by fishing gear 
     
11. Evacuation      
12. Helicopter crash/ emergency 
landing on/near installation   
     
 
 Emergency preparedness phases covered 
 Not applicable   
 Not known   
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7. Discussion  
The chapter is divided in two parts. The first part is based on the eight specific results/findings (in 
Chapter 6) obtained after analyzing the five accidents that have taken place in arctic and sub-
arctic areas (at least to our knowledge; there may be others not known to us). The second part of 
this chapter discusses anticipated (not experienced) challenges for emergency preparedness in 
arctic and sub-arctic areas, based on knowledge from other areas. 
7.1 Discussion of Results 
This section separately discusses the eight results/findings obtained after the analysis of accidents 
which have occurred in arctic and sub-arctic areas. 
 
1. Limited number of accidents 
Since there have been rather few accidents (that we have information about) in the Arctic Sea, the 
relevant experience data on emergency preparedness is scarce and the analysis is correspondingly 
uncertain or incomplete. There may be a degree of non-reporting of accidents which have 
contributed to the limited number of (known) accidents. It should be noted that detailed 
information about the accidents and related emergency information in the Russian Arctic Sea was 
devoid on the websites. This could imply that the Russian authorities are “less eager” to report 
accidents or admit that accidents have occurred.  
 
2. Accidents scattered in time and space 
The accidents have occurred in quite different locations, although only the Russian Arctic Sea 
and US Arctic Sea are represented. Only five accidents have occurred since 1994; however four 
of the five accidents occurred in the last ten years, whereas just one occurred in the ten years 
before that. This seemingly increasing trend is likely a result of increased offshore petroleum 
activity in this northern region. For example, the Russian government has increased the 
exploration activities due to rise in oil prices and nationalization of the oil and gas companies 
(Harsem et al., 2011). 
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3. Russia and USA (Alaska); the hosts of the accidents 
Most of the accidents (3 out of 5) have occurred in the Russian Arctic Sea, which is not 
surprising since Russia is the most active country operating in the Arctic Sea. Russia has well 
developed infrastructure along with 25 ice breakers and record breaking lengths of pipeline 
structures as compared to all other Arctic countries (Harsem et al., 2011). Similarly, the other two 
accidents, which occurred in the Alaskan Arctic Sea, can be due to the fact that offshore 
petroleum activity started quite early in this region and is progressing at a fast pace. It is also 
reasonable to have more accidents and activities in Russia as it has more of the hydrocarbon 
reserves as compared to the other countries bordering the Arctic Sea.  
 
The hydrocarbons reserves in Norway, Canada and Greenland are considerably smaller than in 
Russia and Alaska. Therefore, the offshore activities in these countries have either not started or 
is growing at a gradual pace. The Greenland authorities will launch the licensing rounds in 2012 
and 2013 which might be a proper start of offshore petroleum exploration and production in the 
Greenland Arctic Sea. Although Canada is involved in important petroleum projects in the Arctic 
Sea but further exploration is heavily dependent on its regulations and energy demands from 
USA (Harsem et al., 2011). The somewhat gradual pace of exploration activities in Norway, 
Canada and Greenland may be a good strategy to avoid accidents. 
 
4. Types of accidents and their consequences 
The five accidents which occurred in the Arctic region were two pipeline leaks, one blowout, one 
ship collision, and one rig capsize. Only the latter resulted in loss of lives while all the other 
accidents resulted in oil spills which, however, is of great concern in this region. The response to 
oil spills in icy and remote areas is challenging. The response measures can span over months 
and can be less effective. However, Shell claims to have an adequate system for the coping of 
acute oil spills in the Alaskan Arctic region using advanced response strategies and equipment 
(Shell, 2011b). 
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The accidents of Kolskya (capsize) and Nefterudovoz-57 (ship collision) can imply that the 
Russian companies might face challenges in the Arctic Sea which they have never experienced 
before. This combined with the “so what” attitudes of the Russian authorities after oil spill 
accidents such as the Usinsk accident is a source of concern. According to environmentalists, 
every year one percent of Russian’s annual oil production is spilled, which is almost equivalent to 
one Deepwater Horizon accident leak every two months. It is said that “leaks of less than 8 tons 
are classified only as incidents and carry no penalties”. Having more than hundred environmental 
degraded hot spots in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation reflects an alarming situation 
(Vasilyeva, 2011b). Different resources claim different estimates of oil spills; however, it can be 
assumed that oil spills and unwanted incidents in the Russian Arctic Sea are numerous and 
extensive. 
 
5. Only a few types of accidents (DSHAs) have occurred 
The results shows that the accidents related to DSHA 3, 7, 8 and 9 have occurred while most of 
the other major DSHAs, DSHA 1-2, 4-6, and 10-12, have not occurred. Amongst these DSHAs, 
it may be the case that the accidents related to DSHA 1, 5, 6 and 11 have not been reported even 
though they may have occurred (due to minor consequences). For example, DSHA 5 and 6 can be 
considered “only” as threats that is, the threat of vessel on collision course (DSHA 5) or drifting 
object (DSHA 6) that may result in a collision. 
  
 
6. Emergency phases: Alert and normalization 
The analysis of the accidents shows that the first (alert) and last (normalization) phase of 
emergency response were present in all the accidents, which is not surprising. The alert or 
notification phase is necessary to initiate the emergency preparedness operation, unless one 
attempts to conceal the facts about the accident. Similarly, the normalization phase is a natural 
and final step in the emergency preparedness operation, although it is not unusual that the 
information about this phase is scarce (except for the cases of oil spills which can result in a long 
lasting normalization phase).  
 
                                                     Proactive Emergency Preparedness in the Barents Sea  
 
Salma Basharat   50 
 
 
 
It might be possible that some of the petroleum related accidents only required the alert and 
normalization phases as part of the emergency response, since they were mainly related to oil 
spills and not to the rescue and evacuation of personnel. It is also possible that the emergency 
response information was missing for the other phases.  
 
An important lesson learned from the past emergency responses is that the normalization phase 
lasts longer due to harsh weather conditions in the Arctic Sea. For the Qugruk 2 well blow out 
accident, the cleaning process during the normalization phase was prolonged while the other 
contingency plans were adequate. Furthermore, communication of adequate information during 
the normalization phase is important in order to avoid delays.  
 
7. Emergency phases: Rescue and evacuation 
The immediate consequences of most of the accidents (Alaska oil spill, Nefterudovoz-57, Usinsk 
accident) did not affect the personnel, so there was no need for rescue and evacuation operations. 
This will probably be the case also in the future for minor oil spills. However, accidents with 
large oil spills may affect the community living nearby which means that rescue or evacuation 
may have to be executed subsequently. 
 
The information about rescue and evacuation operations for one of the accidents shows that these 
two phases can be prolonged due to large distances from onshore as well as due to cold weather. 
The search of missing people after Kolskaya rig capsize took a quite long time. In order to avoid 
such mishaps in the future, effective search and rescue equipment capable of operating in the 
Arctic Sea should be considered. 
 
 
8. Experienced challenges due to harsh environment 
The causes of the accidents and the delay in the emergency operations, at least in part, can be 
ascribed to the climatic conditions in the Arctic Sea. The Kolskya rig sank in the sea as ice and 
waves damaged it while the Maxim Gorky cruise ship collided with an iceberg. Similarly the cold 
weather hindered the emergency operation for the Alaska oil spill, Kolskaya rig accident and 
Qugruk 2 well blowout.  
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According to Harsem et al. (2011), the frequency of polar storms and hurricanes in the Arctic Sea 
is likely to increase in the future. This can affect the offshore drilling, production and emergency 
operation in case of an oil spill. Further, shallow water of the Arctic Sea can enlarge the huge 
waves thereby resulting in the sinking of offshore platforms. The largest uncertainty arises when 
we know that the Arctic ice is melting and therefore can bring climatic changes for the companies 
operating in arctic and their capacity of handling emergency situations.  
 
According to Harsem et al. (2011), the Hibernia platform is able to resist damage by one million 
tons of iceberg while the Newfoundland field has ice berg tracking radars. The new cargo ships 
by Aker have the capacity to detect and break ice in the polar region (Harsem et al., 2011) while 
Goliat vessels have infra red cameras and oil detecting radars (Eni, 2012b).  
 
However, the oil spill behavior and clean up operations in the harsh and challenging weather of 
the Arctic Sea is dominated by unknowns. Therefore, the oil and gas companies and the 
concerned authorities in all of the arctic countries should prepare for the worst case scenarios and 
for the handling of emergency situations in these areas. 
  
7.2 Challenges for Emergency Preparedness in Arctic and Sub­Arctic Areas 
 
The challenges for emergency preparedness in arctic and sub-arctic areas are first of all due to 
rough weather conditions, but they are also related to communication challenges, unreliable 
meteorological data, improper emergency equipment and lack of infrastructure. 
 
 
Rough weather conditions  
The information about the meteorological conditions of the Arctic Sea and the Barents Sea 
(Section 4.1) reveals that the offshore petroleum companies can encounter various challenges for 
the EER operations. The sudden formation of the polar lows can be a significant threat to all 
types of activities, while the combination of strong winds, snow and spray icing can result in 
icing on the vessels making the gravity load higher. Long polar nights in the middle of the winter 
season and limited periods of twilight during the day until the sun returns pose further challenges  
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for EER operations. Snowstorms, which are also a key characteristic of the Barents Sea, can 
temporarily disable the detectors, radars and radio communication thereby making rescue 
operations more difficult. Operational issues also arise due to poor visibility. Extreme fog 
conditions from May to August can delay the helicopters operations, which can be involved in 
the rescue operations.  
 
Information and communication challenges 
The challenge due to long distances from onshore and harsh conditions makes the information 
availability difficult. The Electronic Navigation Charts for the Arctic Sea are not very accurate 
due to ice covering the sea and land. This makes the navigation of ships very difficult thereby 
making EER operations challenging (Kvamstad et al., 2009). Extensive maritime services may be 
required in order to meet information and communication challenges. 
  
Reliable ice and metrological data 
The need for reliable ice data is also identified by the industry and the petroleum companies to 
develop reasonable criteria for the design of offshore equipment. The historical data about the ice 
movement and storm frequencies in the Arctic Sea becomes useless or less effective due to global 
warming (Harsem et al., 2011). Therefore, new and improved technologies for ice navigation 
become vital in order to avoid accidents. 
 
 
Emergency equipment and tools 
The use of proper evacuation and rescue equipment also becomes an important factor during the 
EER operations. Helicopters, for example, are the best means of dry evacuation operations; 
however, in adverse weather conditions the success of the operation depends on wind speed, fog 
and competence of the pilots. Having just a few hours of operational time, helicopters can also 
need refueling if the accident occurs very far from the onshore base.  
 
Polar lows and severe winter conditions can limit the use of escape chutes, survival suits and life 
rafts in the Barents Sea. Also, the lifeboats stability is highly affected by severe ice accretion.  
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The drift ice can also limit the vessel operations during some parts of the year. In that case, 
monitoring and understanding of ice conditions becomes very important. Navigation tools like 
GPS have operation limitation at 75 degree north. In that case, positioning of standby vessels 
becomes more challenging if the incident occurs beyond 75 degree north (Gudmestad & Quale, 
2011; Jacobsen, 2010).  
 
Information related to maintenance of the EER equipment is lacking; however, according to 
MarSafe (2010), the existing EER equipment is often not suitable for the situations in the Arctic 
Sea. It can become challenging to clean the accumulated ice on the emergency equipment 
frequently. In the case of an accident, heavy snow on life boats, escape chutes or any other 
emergency equipment can delay the emergency operations. It is also vital to design appropriate 
survival suits which can keep the crew warm for a longer period of time. 
 
Long distances and lack of infrastructure 
Apart from all these challenges, remoteness and long distances from the onshore facilities can 
complicate the recue and clean up operation in case of an accident. Inaccessible and inhospitable 
terrain can make the rescue operations very complicated. 
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8. Conclusions  
The Arctic Sea is the final resort in the north having abundant petroleum reserves. With the 
increase in oil demand and oil prices, the countries bordering the Arctic Sea are actively involved 
in the exploration and production of hydrocarbons. However, the climatic conditions of the Arctic 
Sea are very harsh. They are characterized by polar lows, long nights, extreme fog, sub-zero 
temperatures and snow storms. Similarly, the weather conditions of the Barents Sea (located 
between Norway and Russia) are also very tough and are characterized by cyclones, wind storms 
and spray/ atmospheric icing. 
 
The challenging weather conditions and ability to handle the emergency situations successfully in 
the arctic and sub-arctic areas have not placed any limitations on the petroleum companies 
operating in the Arctic Sea. Russia, having well developed infrastructure of pipelines, has the 
most active part in the Barents, Pechora and Kara Sea. A large number of companies have 
already started the explorations and production in the Russian Arctic Sea. Norway is highly 
active in the Barents Sea (part of the Arctic Sea). The Norwegian authorities have given 12 
awards in the 21st licensing round to 18 international and local companies for the offshore 
exploration and production in the Barents Sea. The Canadian companies are operating in three oil 
fields (Terra Nova, White Rose and Hibernia) in the Canadian Arctic Sea while hydrocarbon 
production in Alaska (USA) is in the Prudhoe Bay area. The offshore petroleum activity in the 
Arctic Sea belonging to Greenland has already started but is slowly progressing.  
 
There have been rather few accidents in the past twenty years in the Arctic Sea. The accidents, 
which we have been able to account for, were of different types. They include blowout, pipeline 
leak, ship collision and capsize related accidents. Three of the accidents took place in the Russian 
Arctic Sea while two of them took place in USA (Alaska). The most recent accident was the 
Qugruk 2 well blowout accident in 2012 resulting in no major loss. 
 
The NORSOK Z-013 standard lists five phases of emergency preparedness. The phases are alert, 
danger limitation, rescue, evacuation, and normalization. More detailed descriptions of these 
phases are available in the Activities Regulation by PSAN. In the process of risk and emergency  
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preparedness analysis, the party responsible has to prepare a list of Defined Situation of Hazard 
and Accident (DSHA). A company independent set of DSHAs used by PSAN in the “Trends in 
risk level” project (Skjerve et al., 2008) is used in this thesis for the classification of offshore 
petroleum related accidents in the Arctic Sea. Due to scarcity of accidents in the arctic region 
only four DSHAs (out of twelve) have been experienced. It might be possible that some of the 
remaining eight DSHAs have not been reported due to minor consequences.  
 
The accident analysis, structured according to the NORSOK Z-013 emergency preparedness 
phases and the PSAN list of DSHAs, gives an insight about the emergency measures taken and 
provide lessons learned for future offshore petroleum activities in the Arctic Sea. All the 
emergency operations went through the phases of alert and normalization (which is not 
surprising).  
 
For the pipeline leak accident (2006) in Alaska which resulted in oil spill, the emergency 
response was also adequate. Since there were no personnel which were affected, rescue and 
evacuation were not executed. For the Kolskaya rig accident (2011) resulting in capsize and the 
ship collision accident (1994) in the Russian Arctic Sea, the information about the alert and 
normalization phases were available. For the Kolskaya rig accident, the information on rescue 
and evacuation was also available.  
 
The incomplete knowledge about all the phases of emergency response may be due to the fact 
that either the phases were not required or the information about them is missing on the relevant 
sources. It should also be noted that very few accidents in the Arctic Sea provides a scarce 
knowledge base and therefore the analysis of the accidents provides somewhat limited 
information.  
 
One important finding is that the emergency operations were hampered due to harsh weather 
conditions of the Arctic Sea. Therefore, the adequacy of the emergency operations and their 
effectiveness in the harsh and challenging environment of the Arctic Sea has to be ensured in 
future operations. For efficient and successful emergency operations, information about 
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meteorological data, increased situational awareness, improved emergency preparedness tools, 
improved electronic navigation charts and status to/from fairway objects will be required. 
 
 
Besides the experiences gained from real accidents in the Arctic Sea, some additional emergency 
preparedness challenges for arctic and sub-arctic areas can be anticipated. The harsh weather 
situation due to long polar nights, sub-zero temperatures, heavy snow and fog poses constraints 
on the effectiveness of emergency operations in the Arctic Sea. Furthermore, lack of 
infrastructure and communications, remoteness and unreliable ice data may complicate the 
emergency preparedness. 
 
The availability and maintenance of traditional emergency response equipment can also be 
challenging. Specific requirements for the survival suits, lifeboats, escape chutes and rescue 
vessels for use in the Arctic Sea as well as the Barents Sea need to be defined and implemented. 
In case of severe ice conditions, alternatives to lifeboats should be suggested. Specially designed 
helicopters adapted to darkness, long distances and climatic variations should be considered for 
rescue and evacuation operations. 
 
New emergency preparedness regulations, safety standards and advanced technology should be 
incorporated in order to avoid unwanted accidents and oil spills in the arctic areas. All countries 
operating in arctic and sub-arctic areas should be able to comply with all arctic related 
regulations, standards and requirements. The companies should incorporate adequate technology 
and methods based on proactive and continuous learning from previous accidents in order to 
handle the accidents and emergency situations in the Arctic Sea including the Barents Sea 
successfully.  
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Appendix A  
Acronyms  
AMAP  Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme 
AMNGR  Arktikmorneftegazrazvedka 
BPXA   BP Exploration Alaska  
DAE  Dimensioning Accident Event 
DAL  Design Accidental Load 
DSHA  Defined Situation of Hazard and Accident 
DNV   Det Norske Veritas 
EER  Emergency, Escape and Rescue 
EPA  Emergency Preparedness Analysis 
FPSO  Floating Production Storage and Off -Loading vessel 
LNG  Liquefied Natural Gas 
NPD  Norwegian petroleum Directorate 
NPRA  Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority 
OGJ  Oil and Gas Journal 
PSAN   Petroleum Safety Authority Norway 
QRA  Qualitative Risk Analysis 
RNNP  Risikonivå i Norsk petroleumsvirksomhet (Risk in Norwegian Petroleum Industry) 
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